‘Failed States’ in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of the Literature by Di John, Jonathan
Area: Sub-Saharan Africa 
ARI 5/2011 
Date: 14/1/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Failed States’ in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of the 
Literature (ARI) 
 
 
Jonathan Di John*
 
 
Theme: The concept and measurement of ‘failed states’ is not generally helpful in 
understanding the economic and political realities in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
Summary: This paper undertakes a review of the literature that addresses the concept, 
measurement and causes of ‘failed states’ in Sub-Saharan Africa. It finds that concept 
and measurement of ‘failed states’ is not generally helpful in understanding economic and 
political realities in Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, it argues that an aggregate index of 
state performance is unhelpful for policymakers because it misses the wide range of 
capacity across different state functions within polities. It also finds that the main theories 
attempting to explain ‘state failure’ have important theoretical shortcomings and are not 
supported by the evidence. Finally, the paper examines the political economy behind why 
some states in the region are more resilient than others. 
 
 
Analysis: The literature on ‘state failure’ has received considerable attention across the 
range of social science enquiry. Sovereign states are expected to perform certain minimal 
functions for the security and well-being of their citizens as well as the smooth working of 
the international system. The political science and international relations literature has 
been concerned with identifying why the state itself ceases to perform core Weberian 
functions. States that fail to meet these minimal standards have been described as ‘weak’, 
‘fragile’ or ‘poorly performing’ (Torres & Anderson, 2004, p. 5). More extreme cases have 
been labelled ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’. The growing interest in state failure is no coincidence. 
This is because the number of new or embryonic states has grown dramatically in the last 
half of the 20th century (Rotberg, 2003). 
 
The interest in state breakdown at this core level has been sparked by the urgency of 
understanding the factors behind political violence and civil war, and the growth of terrorist 
organisations in many less-developed countries (Cramer 2006; Menkhaus, 2004). The 
proliferation of labels –ranging from ‘crisis states’, ‘countries at risk of instability’, 
‘challenging environments’ and ‘countries under stress’– reflects the range of ways in 
which the core problem has been conceived (Torres & Anderson, 2004, p. 5). 
 
In recent times, the failure of US interventions in Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan have 
heightened academic and foreign policy interests in conceptualising the notion of ‘failed’ 
states. Fearon & Laitin (2004), for instance, argue that failed states create ‘international 
public bads’, and other negative spillovers (such as harbouring criminal organisations) 
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and thus the international community needs to develop forms of ‘neo-trusteeship’ in order 
to intervene to build states. US foreign policy has been shaped, particularly since the 
September 11 bombings, by the potential threat of so-called ‘failed states’. 
 
(1) What is a Failed State? 
Helman & Ratner (1993) were among the first analysts to use the term ‘failed state’. They 
were concerned about ‘a disturbing new phenomenon’ whereby a state was becoming 
‘utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community’. They 
argued that a failed state would ‘[imperil] their own citizens and [threaten] their neighbours 
through refugee flow, political instability and random warfare’. Michael Ignatieff (2002) 
adopts a Machiavellian/Weberian understanding of state failure when he argues that state 
failure occurs when ‘the central government loses the monopoly of the means of violence’ 
(p. 118). In the wider sense of state failure, Zartman (1995) develops the idea of state 
failure along the lines of Hobbesian social contract theory. For Zartman, state failure 
occurs when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed as well as referring 
to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order 
have fallen apart. 
 
There are many categories and definitions of ‘state failure’ that have proliferated in the 
literature. State failure can occur in many dimensions such as security, economic 
development, political representation, income distribution and so on. According to Rotberg 
(2002): ‘nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to 
their people. Their governments lose legitimacy, and in the eyes and hearts of a growing 
plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate’ (p. 85). ‘Failed’ or 
‘collapsed’ in his view is the end stage of failure. In extreme cases, failure may occur on 
all dimensions simultaneously as in Somalia. However, in most cases, there is a wide 
variation in the extent to which a state ‘fails’ across different dimensions. In Colombia, for 
instance, the state has been relatively impressive in macroeconomic management, but 
has been unable to control large parts of its rural areas where guerrilla and paramilitary 
groups and drug cartels are powerful. It is thus imperative for any definition of ‘failure’ to 
be explicit in which dimension a state fails. Given the variation in state capacity across 
sectors, aggregate measures or categorisations of ‘failure’ can be misleading. 
 
The failed-states literature stresses that there are certain indicators that are necessary (if 
not sufficient) to categorise a state as ‘failed’. Rotberg (2003) identifies three important 
indicators. First, the persistence of political violence is salient in most definitions of ‘failed 
states’. For Rotberg (2003), ‘failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and 
bitterly contested by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle 
armed revolts led by one or more warring factions’ (p. 5). In his definition, the absolute 
intensity of violence does not define a failed state. Rather, it is the enduring character of 
that violence (as in Angola, Burundi and Sudan), the direction of such violence against an 
existing government or regime, and the vigorous character of the political or geographical 
demands for shared power or autonomy that rationalise or justify that violence that 
identifies a failed state. 
 
A closely related indicator of state failure is the growth of criminal violence (ibid.). Here the 
presence of gangs, criminal syndicates, arms and drug-trafficking are the most cited. As a 
result of the failure of a state to provide security from violent non-state actors, people 
often seek protection from warlords or other armed rivals of the state. A third indicator of 
failed states concerns their inability to control their borders and/or significant chunks of 
their territory (ibid). Often the expression of official power is limited to the capital city and 
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one or more ethnically-specific zones. Indeed one measure of the extent of state failure is 
how much of the state’s geographical expanse a government genuinely controls. 
 
Rotberg also introduces the idea that it is possible to rank failures according to the 
number of dimensions in which a state fails to deliver positive political goods. In order to 
rank the severity of state failure, Rotberg suggests that there is a hierarchy of positive 
state functions. These are: (1) security; (2) institutions to regulate and adjudicate conflicts, 
rule of law, secure property rights and contract enforcement; (3) political participation; and 
(4) social service delivery, infrastructure and regulation of the economy. In this analysis, 
strong states perform well across these categories and with respect to each separately. 
Weak states show a mixed profile, and failed states are a sub-category of weak states. 
The main idea developed by Rotberg is that no single indicator provides certain evidence 
that a strong state is becoming weak or a weak state is beginning to fail. As a result, it is 
necessary to take the indicators together. 
 
Secondly, aggregate indicators do not provide information about variations of state 
capacity across functions. There are several examples of countries that have failed 
economically but have not experienced large-scale political violence (such as Tanzania 
and Zambia). Third, the lack of political participation does not necessarily weaken a state 
internally. Much of the literature in fact finds that semi-authoritarian regimes (so-called 
‘anocracies’) are more prone to political violence than either more open democracies or 
more authoritarian regimes (Marshall & Gurr, 2003). For instance, Iraq under Saddam 
Hussain, however distasteful, was not a ‘failed state’ in all the above-mentioned 
dimensions despite the absence of widespread political participation. The same could be 
said of Angola, Ethiopia and South Africa in the era of apartheid. The idea that repression 
is a necessary indicator of ‘failure’ is an ahistorical proposition given the construction of 
many developmental states before democracy became a source of legitimate government 
rule (Moore, 1966). Finally, the extent of corruption and bureaucratic capacity, which is 
cited as an indicator of failure, is also misleading. Cross-country evidence for less 
developed countries suggests that levels of corruption and bureaucratic capacity do not 
determine long-run growth rates (Khan, 2007). However, the idea that state ‘failure’ 
should be broken down into sub-categories is useful. This is because of the co-existence 
of variations in state capacity at a given time in one country and because of the 
movement of states to and from more and less severe conditions of failure. 
 
The main problem with ranking states according to a ‘failure index’ (such as the CIA’s 
Directorate of Intelligence in 2000) is that state formation is a historical process that is 
open-ended and continually subject to contestation, particularly in the case of new/post-
war and low-income states. The terms ‘state failure’ or ‘failed state’ are clearly 
inappropriate since they imply that there is an ‘end state’ in which the ‘failure’ arrives in 
final form. The term ‘failing state’, as Dorff (2000) suggests, is somewhat more 
appropriate as it suggests a process of failing, and better fits the perspective of a 
continuum along which increased weakening of the state governing capacity occurs. 
Failure, however defined, needs to be understood in the historical context in which it 
occurs. It is misleading, for example, to define a ‘failed state’ in the context where state 
formation never really happened in the first place. Just as misleading is to refer to two 
states as ‘failed’ when such ‘failure’ occurs from very different initial conditions (ie, a state 
that never consolidated such as Afghanistan versus a polity where significant state 
formation and capacity has taken place, such as Zimbabwe). Moreover, if policy 
intervention is to be more effective, it is useful to establish the time frame of ‘state failure’: 
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processes of state weakening are likely to have different characteristics and dynamics if 
they are at an advanced as opposed to an initial phase. 
 
Rather than insisting that states need to be pigeon-holed as ‘successful’ or ‘failed’, a 
framework should allow for an assessment of state effectiveness along a continuum 
where conflict and violence (far from an aberration of state formation and development) 
are an integral part of these processes. In this perspective, it is possible to assess 
violence, war and non-state challenges not only as ‘development in reverse’ (though this 
may occur in the case of failed states), but as both reflective of the political economy of 
state formation in less developed economies, and, as history attests, the extent to which 
such contestations have the potential to be developmental. Such a framework also allows 
for assessing effectiveness in the sub-components of a state. This is useful since state 
capacities are not uniform across functions. 
 
(2) Causes of State Failure 
There have been several theories that seek to explain why states fail. The ‘resource 
curse’ is perhaps the most influential explanation, and has been written on and critiqued 
extensively (Di John, 2007, 2009; Rosser, 2006). A second set of important theories of 
state failure have been subject to less scrutiny. These are the so-called functionalist 
theories of the state. A series of authors working on post-colonial African states have 
challenged the idea that ‘state failure’ is a useful way of examining how elites in actually 
existing political systems legitimate rule, accumulate capital and maintain a semblance of 
political stability in the context of underdevelopment (Keen, 1998; Bayart, 1993; Reno, 
1995, 1998; Chabal & Daloz, 1999). They challenge the basic idea of measuring degrees 
of ‘stateness’ along a continuum starting with those that meet classical Weberian criteria 
of statehood and ending with those that meet none of the criteria of ‘successful’ 
statehood. In general these authors seek to explain how anti-developmental states have 
emerged as well as attempting to explain the political logic holding these states together. 
 
The starting point for most of these theories is to explain the emergence of patrimonial 
and clientelist politics.1 Many authors point out that the speed with which independence 
occurred created the context which generated politics based on political patronage 
(Cooper, 2002). The need to construct political alliances at short notice with minimal 
resources and the absence of party organisation outside urban areas meant that 
nationalist leaders –typically urban, union-based teachers, union leaders and 
administrators– had to rely on existing political structures. This meant finding individuals –
often chiefs or other prominent notables– and using patronage to bind these individuals to 
the party and local voters to candidates. 
 
There are several influential theories worth considering. First, Bayart (1993) develops the 
idea of the ‘politics of the belly’, which is defined as the predatory pursuit, or rush for 
spoils, of wealth and power that, as a mode of governance, takes historically-specific 
                                                 
1 Following the standard Weberian definition, patrimonialism is a system of personal rule based on 
administrative and military personnel, who are responsible only to the ruler. Neo-patrimonialism, a term first 
coined by Eisenstadt (1973), and one which features prominently (though not exclusively) in the political 
science literature on Africa, commonly refers to a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly 
patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal 
lines (Clapham, 1985, p. 39-60). In this system, the office of power is used for personal uses and gains, as 
opposed to a strict division of the private and public spheres. Clientelism, in this article, refers to a specific set 
of patron-client relationships where leaders (patrons) provide state resources in the form of credits, subsidies, 
and employment opportunities to clients (individuals and groups) in order to secure the loyalty of such clients. 
One common form of client loyalty is voting for the party responsible for dispensing with state patronage. 
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forms appropriate to the post-colonial state in Africa. The predatory nature of the state, 
according to Bayart, generates incentives for leaders to ‘eat’ from the resources of the 
state. In this model, the invasion of ever-wider spheres of economic activity by informal 
political networks leads to the ‘criminalisation of the state’. The criminalisation of the state 
and its associated corruption at all levels in Africa is less a sign of state ‘failure’ than a 
mechanism of social organisation that has to be related to the specific historical 
experiences, cultural repertoires and political trajectories of the sub-continent through 
which political power is disseminated and wealth re-distributed. 
 
A second model is the idea that the late colonial legacy created incentives for leaders to 
use ‘disorder as a political instrument’ (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). This refers to the process 
by which political actors in Africa seek to maximise their returns on the state of confusion, 
uncertainty and sometimes even chaos which characterises most African polities. The use 
and creation of personalised informal patron-client networks is central to their argument. 
For Chabal & Daloz these might include kinship, witchcraft, ethnic or religious forms of 
identity that are the outcome of different rationalities, and the instrumentalisation of 
different forms of disorder that are more attuned to maintaining social bonds that ‘work’ in 
Africa. Implicit in their argument is that the legitimacy of rule depends less on delivering 
rapid economic growth and employment creation than on accommodating powerful elite 
factions. A key policy prescription of the model is that the introduction of economic 
liberalisation and multi-party electoral politics are likely to allow even greater scope for 
those powerful ‘businessmen of crime’ (such as warlords and high-level political patrons 
who use disorder and violence to accumulate capital) to flourish, as such liberalisation 
policies tend to reinforce the power of ‘shadowy’ entrepreneurial elites (Chabal & Daloz, 
1999, p. 91). 
 
A third model is the idea of the ‘shadow state’ developed by William Reno (1995). The 
idea of elite accommodation is central to the argument. For Reno, the end of the Cold War 
and the rise of economic and political liberalisation policies put traditional patterns of 
patronage under pressure in sub-Saharan Africa. Such liberalisation processes, he 
argues, further undermined the incentives of the rulers of weak states to pursue 
conventional strategies for maximising power through generating economic growth and, 
hence, state revenues. In this context, economic motives and objectives are not the 
unique purview of rebel forces, but can also include those of personalistic rulers of corrupt 
‘shadow states’ who maximise the use of violence to ‘manage their own economic 
environments’ siphoning off state resources for personal enrichment and the 
establishment of patronage networks, instead of providing public goods such as security 
and economic governance. Rulers address the internal threat of warlord politics by 
transforming their own political authority into an effective means of controlling markets 
without reliance on formal state institutions. Weak state rulers use new and strengthened 
alliances with outsiders to shed old clients and discipline those who remain. Reno (1995, 
p. 8), in his analysis of central African states –Angola, Sierra Leone, Zaire/DRC–, 
describes how leaders have based their personal power and derived individual wealth 
from the overt and clandestine manipulation of markets, at times with the connivance of 
foreign investors in natural resource enclaves such as oil. 
 
In general, functional and new war theses move beyond simply measuring state failure. 
They seek to understand the rationale for state breakdown and its often associated 
political violence. These theories seek to explore how the changing nature of international 
economic and political relations affects the viability of states in poor countries. 
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(3) Shortcomings of the State Failure Theories 
While functionalist theories provide important insights about ‘state failure’, they also have 
several important shortcomings. First, leaders are assumed to have predatory or 
distributional aims as opposed to developmental ones. The neglect of the political 
processes through which a leader appropriates power limits our understanding of the 
motivations of state leaders. As a result, these analyses cannot explain why capital 
accumulation requires state breakdown, or ‘the instrumental use of disorder’ in some 
cases and not others. 
 
Secondly, the idea that neo-patrimonial politics is necessarily anti-developmental is 
ahistorical. The problem with Chabal & Daloz’s analysis, for example, is that what they 
refer to as a specifically African problem is actually a general characteristic of all 
developing countries undergoing processes of primitive accumulation and associated 
political corruption (Khan, 2007; Hutchcroft, 1997). The key analytical challenge is to 
explain why some countries are able to create more developmental outcomes in the 
context of clientelism and corruption and why other states do not (Kohli, 2004; Khan & 
Jomo, 2000). For example, functionalist theories cannot explain why economic growth 
rates vary across (clientelist) sub-Saharan African polities, or why many countries in sub-
Saharan Africa achieved rates of growth close to East Asia and Latin America in the 
period 1960-80 (Mkandawire, 2001). 
 
Third, there is little analysis in these theories as to why violent and non-violent challenges 
to state authority actually succeed in some countries or why such challenges lead to state 
collapse in some contexts as opposed to others. The idea that the ‘shadow state’ always 
‘works’ flies in the face of the many civil wars and coups where leaders were unable to 
use informal patronage to stay in power or even stay alive. 
 
Perhaps the weakest aspect of functionalist theories, however, is the sweeping 
generalisation that there is one type of African politics. Kaplan (1984), for instance, 
portrays West Africa as epitomising ‘the coming anarchy’ (in which scarcity, crime, over-
population, tribalism and disease are rapidly overwhelming states and societies). He 
argues that ‘Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring albeit in a more tempered 
and gradual manner throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world’ (p. 
48). 
 
Allen (1995) critiques the idea that there is one type of patrimonial politics in Africa. He 
makes a distinction between two variants of the post-colonial state moving beyond the 
simple neo-patrimonial description. He argues that the response to the instability of 
clientelism in some states, including Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire 
was to centralise and bureaucratise power. Political parties were displaced as the main 
distributors of clientelist resources by a bureaucracy under control of the President. In 
other states, including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, Ghana and Somalia, Allen 
argues the incipient crisis of clientelism was not resolved; leaders did not bureaucratise, 
nor did they centrally control clientelism. The system became more unstable. Allen 
describes these regimes as having ‘spoils politics’ with a more winner-take-all nature of 
electoral politics, more pervasive and fragmented corruption, greater economic crises, 
with a greater disintegration of political institutions and mediations. It is these regimes that 
give full expression to Bayart’s notion of ‘politics of the belly’. 
 
While it is not clear that the long-run economic growth rates between these two types of 
politics differs on average (or whether all the states remained in the same category over 
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time), it appears to be the case that countries with more centralised clientelist systems (as 
identified by Allen) have avoided state collapse and large-scale and prolonged political 
violence.2 The sample size is too small to make any definitive statements. However, 
developing more refined typologies of polities within Africa and tracing the extent to which 
states move from one category to another, and why, will help identify which political 
factors are crucial to prevent fragile states from failing or even collapsing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Reflections on New Approaches to Measuring and Addressing ‘State Failure’ 
There are several research avenues worth pursuing with respect to the interest in ‘failed 
states’. First, more disaggregated indices should be developed. An aggregate index (eg, 
‘state failure indices’) does not provide any information on the extent to which capacity 
varies across different state functions or sectors within a polity. The historical evidence 
suggests that state capacity varies substantially across functions and sectors within 
polities. There are numerous examples of this. For instance, South African tax collection 
capacity (by far, the best among middle-income countries) is much greater than its ability 
to undertake industrial policy or tackle HIV/AIDS. Botswana’s democratic institutions are 
among the most robust in the developing world yet it has also been very poor at 
controlling HIV/AIDS. Brazil has among the highest levels of tax take but is not (politically) 
capable of collecting personal income and property tax. The Colombian state is known for 
among the best macroeconomic management but has among the lowest tax takes in Latin 
America, and is unable to contain decades of guerrilla and paramilitary political violence. 
Tanzania and Zambia have had relatively poor records on economic performance but 
have been able to prevent large-scale political violence, unlike most of their neighbouring 
countries. This variation in capacity is not picked up by aggregate measures and thus our 
understanding of why capacity varies so much within polities is limited in such a 
framework. Detailed historical analyses of the political coalitions and settlements 
underpinning specific state capacities are essential to increase understanding of variable 
state capacity within a polity and provide a fruitful ground for research.3
 
Secondly, understanding why some low-income countries avoid large-scale political 
violence does not merit particular attention. Political science has long been concerned 
with the problem of what types of political arrangements, or in our terms political 
settlements, generate basic political order and stability. This issue concerned the likes of 
Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes and others. More recent examinations of the issue have 
argued that, at low levels of development, the general nature of political settlements that 
are likely to generate political order are far from inclusionary. 
 
The principal solution through history to the classic Hobbesian problem of endemic 
violence is the creation of what North et al. (2007) call ‘limited access orders’ (as opposed 
to the much rarer ‘open access orders’, which characterise advanced market economies. 
The limited access order creates limits on the access to valuable political and economic 
functions as a way to generate rents. The dominant coalition within a political settlement 
creates opportunities and order by limiting the access to valuable resources –land, labour 
and capital– or access and control of valuable activities –such as contract enforcement, 
property rights enforcement, trade, worship, and education– to elite groups. When 
                                                 
2 South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius would be three countries that maintained a relatively centralised state. 
3 Most useful indices are not designed to tell the whole story. Actually, it is good that they refrain from doing 
so (Gutierrez et al 2010). Indeed, a great danger of indexes is “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970), trying to 
measure more than one thing at a time. 
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powerful individuals and groups become privileged insiders and thus possess rents 
relative to those individuals and groups excluded (and since violence threatens or reduces 
those rents), the existence of rents makes it in the interest of the ‘privileged insiders’ to 
cooperate with the coalition in power rather than to fight. In effect, limited access orders 
create a credible commitment among elites that they will not fight each other. This is the 
basis for a stable ‘elite bargain’. 
 
The shape of the elite bargain on which a political settlement rests is central to 
understanding differential trajectories of state resilience, that is, the ability of the state to 
establish and maintain control over coercive power, administrative authority and popular 
allegiance. This is not adequately addressed in the North et al. (2007) model. Recent 
work on Zambia (Di John, 2010) and Uganda (Lindemann, 2010) suggests that the shape 
and character of the elite bargain matters for the prospects of political stability. Di John’s 
(2010) study on Zambia suggests how and why the construction of political organisations, 
particularly dominant political parties, has been central to providing the institutional 
mechanisms of distributing patronage to regional elites and to important political 
constituencies in ways that either prevent challenges to authority and/or maintain 
cohesion of the ruling coalition. Further evidence of the importance of political party 
organisation and centralised patronage in the maintaining state resiliency can be seen in 
the cases of South Africa, Tanzania Botswana and Mauritius. These countries all have 
strong centralised national parties. 
 
Of course, there are other dimensions of the central role played by the political 
organisation of elite bargains within political settlements in determining trajectories of 
resilience and fragility (or development). These include the ideological role of the political 
organisation in control of the state, both in fostering national identity and in broadcasting 
the state’s presence throughout the territory. This may be decisive in terms of developing 
a state capacity to ensure control of coercive power and administrative authority. There 
are, as well, important agency factors that intervene that depend largely on the qualities of 
individual leaders that wield executive authority. It would be hard to imagine an 
explanation of the trajectory followed in Tanzania without reference to the particular 
qualities of Julius Nyerere. 
 
In sum, far more research on the nature of elite bargains and political settlements more 
generally is required if we are to understand why and how states perform across a range 
of public functions. Moreover, more research is required to explain why some elite 
bargains generate both resilience and long-run economic growth in some contexts (such 
as in Botswana and Mauritius) and why in other cases, achieving state resilience seems 
to come at the expense of long-run economic development (such as in Zambia, Malawi 
and Tanzania). 
 
Jonathan Di John 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London 
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